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On Information and the Chance of Teaching 
 
 
 
Abstract: Through an engagement with Jacques Derrida’s essay “The Principle of 
Reason, The University in the Eyes of its Pupils”, this paper mounts a critique of the 
current information model of  education dominating contemporary universities. In the 
name of reason, it argues for an account of things which are inform, informé. 
     * 
Keywords: Deconstruction. Jacques Derrida. Literary Theory. Eductional Theory. 
Cultural Theory. 
     * 
 
 
 
 
 According to Bataille, the informé or formless is what ‘academic men’ repress 
(Bataille 31). For Bataille’s ‘academic men’ only one thing counts and that is shape, 
or form. This vision of the university and of those who inhabit it is thoroughly modern 
of course. It would be anachronistic to criticize Bataille’s vision of academia on this 
count. Writing in the late-1920s, the university Bataille refers to is fundamentally 
modern, dominated by an Enlightenment ideal in which the role of academic men is to 
give a name and a form to all things. Bataille’s modern academic men are in the 
Enlightenment business of accumulating, counting, assessing and cataloguing things. 
To imagine the relevance of Bataille’s informé to the university today, however, we 
have to shift our focus.
1
 
                                                          
1
 . This paper is not about Bataille (for which I apologize to my editors), it simply takes off from the 
idea of the informé and attempts to use it in the context in which Bataille presents it. I am using here 
the translation to be found in Georges Bataille, Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939, ed. 
Allan Stoekl, trans. Alan Stoekl with Carl R. Lovitt and Donald M. Leslie, Jr., Minneapolis: University 
 2 
 It is a common complaint of liberal and conservative writers within the current 
academy that what we might call the giving of form has been highjacked. An unholy 
convergence has occurred, such voices complain, between the legitimate search for 
form within the university disciplines and a bureaucratic, state-sponsored formation 
which is now, in all its multifaceted appearances, impossible to avoid or even 
negotiate. A sentence from Ronald Barnett’s ‘A Knowledge Strategy for Universities’ 
should suffice here: 
The university is not free to determine the nature of the knowledge projects in  
which it is engaged. In both teaching and research, and indirectly through new 
evaulation systems, the knowledge projects are encouraged in the direction of 
competence in the most general sense. Likely effectiveness in a dual context 
of a global economy and of a problematic welfare state are the order of the day 
rather than a contribution to human understanding. Knowledge becomes 
reduced to information; wisdom (a now archaic term) becomes reduced and 
altered into mere competence.
2
 
 
There is an implicit figure of invasion, even vampirism, in such accounts of the 
current state of the university. The imperative (rights) of reason (‘contribution to 
human understanding’) have been taken over, inhabited, possessed by a performative, 
wholly commercial force which goes by many names, but none more devastatingly 
than that of information. Information, rather than wisdom, reason and human 
understanding, now dominates the giving of form in the post-modern university. A 
legitimate internal formation has been body-snatched by an illegimate, externalized 
formation which replaces propositional knowledge with operational knowledge, 
reason with competence, critical thought with consumerism, understanding with 
information. Anne Griffin, in the same collection, The End of Knowledge in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of Minnesota Press, 1985, p.31. I would like here to cite as an influence the extraordinarily stimulating 
papers I was lucky enough to chair at this year’s International Association for Philosophy and 
Literature conference at the University of Leeds, Writing Aesthetics, May 26-31, 2003: John William 
Philips ‘Destined to Disappear: The University’s Address;’ Sarah Wood, ‘Hidden Terror;’ Roy Sellars, 
‘Educational Remains: Back to School with Hegel’ and Mark Currie ‘The University and the 
Universal.’ 
2
 . Ronald Barnett,  ‘A Knowledge Strategy for Universities’ in Ronald Barnett and Anne Griffin, eds. 
The End of Knowledge in Higher Education, London: Cassell, 1997, p.169. 
 3 
Education, puts the case in an alarmingly stark manner and, like Barnett, finds the 
root of the ‘current crisis’ in the rise to dominance of a criteria of ‘competence,’ or 
information: 
The utilitarian ethos of competency has . . . begun to find a grip on higher 
education, with its emphasis on skills, performance criteria and measurable 
outcomes. This threatens the achievement by the learner of broader intellectual 
qualities, knowledge and understanding which has some potential for use in a 
variety of contexts. 
 This learner is not the reasoning individual of the Enlightenment: he or 
she is a consuming individual, consuming education as one product among 
others in the market economy. Just as the consumer can accept or reject goods 
available on the market, secure in the rule that the customer is always right, so 
the ‘consuming’ student can reject the knowledge and expertise higher 
education has to offer at will, without a need to justify such choice . . . . 
Conceptualization is downgraded in favour of information gathering: the 
consumer is free to reject the demand to think.
3
 
 
 The idea of the market taking over from a pure realm of Enlightenment values 
within the university is, of course, a rather crass myth. What concerns me here is how 
Bataille’s idea of the formless might help us think about the current shibboleth of all 
liberal and conservative responses to the state of the university, namely information. 
 Derrida’s approach to the convergence of Enlightenment and politico-
commercial forces within the university is encapsulated in the opening, rhetorical 
sentence of his essay ‘Les pupilles de l’Université, Le principe de raison et l’idée de 
l’Université’ translated as ‘The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its 
Pupils’: ‘Comment ne pas parler, aujourd’hui, de l’Université’ (‘Today, how can we 
not speak of the university?’)4 Typically, Derrida’s opening statement spills out in 
terms of its potential significance beyond the essay which it prefaces. It is a statement 
of quite unaccountable irony, and yet it is also one which demands (commands) all 
our attention, if we desire, that is, to remain, somehow, university men and women. 
                                                          
3
 . Anne Griffin, ‘Knowledge Under Attack: Consumption, Diversity and the Need for Values’ in 
Barnett and Griffin, eds. opp. cit., p.5. 
 4 
Would one wish not to speak of the university? How could one not speak, when 
speaking, of the University? The body-snatchers, a phrase I would apply to all 
academics who would strive to nostalgically preserve a university integrity that never 
actually existed, might reply that it has become increasingly difficult to speak of the 
university since the university now speaks of itself incessantly. In all the baroque 
paraphernalia of the post-modern bureaucratic university (Quality Assessments, 
Research Exercises, initiatives for the promotion of Excellence and Transparency, 
institutional assessment procedures for the delivery of modular units, and so on) the 
university speaks about itself endlessly. In so doing, so the body-snatchers would 
argue, the reigning commercialized and state-sponsored discourse drowns out, in fact 
evacuates, any possibility for talking about the university in its own modern, 
Enlightenment terms. To quote another, recent text of the body-snatching school: 
Universities are supposed by the Charter [for Higher Education, 1993] to 
‘deliver’” a ‘service’, namely higher education, to ‘customers,’ in two 
divisions, firstly students, and secondly business, which ‘buys’ both education 
and the results of commissioned research. The ‘delivery’ to students is by way 
of ‘teaching’ or ‘effective management of . . . learning’, in ‘courses’, all of 
which have ‘aims and structures’ clearly described in advance, and any of 
which includes ‘transferable skills like problem-solving and effective 
communication.’ The standards of these providers of teaching are guaranteed 
by ‘quality assurance systems’ which will be ‘regularly audited’ and will 
enable applicants to discover ‘how well different universities and colleges are 
performing.’ 
 Each of the phrases within quotation marks, and all of them 
cumulatively, betray a conception of higher education which is not only not 
that of the university, but is actively hostile to the university.
5
 
 
Maskell and Robinson’s ‘not only not that’ registers well the body-snatchers’ 
response to Derrida’s question. For them the university’s speech has been taken from 
it, transformed into an alien speech, a negative (or ‘not’) speech, the speech of a body 
which would, and once could, speak otherwise. For the body-snatcher school the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4
 . Jacques Derrida, Du Droit à la philosophie, Paris: Galilée, 1990,  p.461; ‘The Principle of Reason: 
The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils’ trans. Catherine Porter and Edward P. Morris, in Diacritics, 
13.3., 1983, p.3. 
 5 
question is simply ‘how can we any longer speak of and as the university’? The 
answer can only come in the form of a defiant or pathos-riddled nostalgia. It 
frequently arrives in the form of a militant strike against information and for the 
apparently pre-given forms of thought: understanding, wisdom, reason, critical 
thought. 
 Derrida, of course, asks his question deconstructively. The university has 
always failed to speak of itself as the site of the principle of reason, since reason 
cannot speak of itself without exposing the abyss, the groundlessness, of its speaking. 
Reason, in other words, cannot itself act as the ground upon which the principle of  
reason is erected or instituted into a university law. The university, as an institution in  
which reason is the foundational idea, has irresolvable problems in founding itself as 
a university.
6
 In ‘The Principle of Reason,’ Derrida puts this point in terms of 
Heideggar’s reading of Liebnitz’s ‘Omnis veritas reddi ratio potest’ or ‘rationem 
reddere,’ which Derrida translates as “‘rendre raison,’ or, in English, the rather 
‘outlandish’ sounding phrase, to ‘render reason’ (“Principle,” 7): 
Are we obeying the principle of reason when we ask what grounds this 
principle which is itself a principle of grounding? We are not – which does not 
mean that we are disobeying it, either. Are we dealing here with a circle or an 
abyss? The circle would consist in seeking to account for reason by reason, to 
render reason to the principle of reason, in appealing to the principle in order 
to make it speak of itself at the very point where, according to Heideggar, the 
principle of reason says nothing about reason itself. The abyss, the hole, the 
Abrund, the empty ‘gorge’ would be the impossibility for a principle of 
grounding to ground itself. This very grounding, then, like the university, 
would have to hold itself, suspended above a most peculiar void. Are we to 
use reason to account for the principle of reason? Is the reason for reason 
rational? (9) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5
 . Duke Maskell and Ian Robinson, The New Idea of the University, London: Haven Books, 2001, p.3. 
6
 See, for example, ‘Privilège. Titre justificatif et Remarques introductives’ and ‘Mochlos - ou le 
conflict des facultés’ in Du Droit, opp. cit., pp.9-108, 397-438; ‘Privilege: Justificatory Title and 
Introductory Remarks’ in Who’s Afraid of Philosophy? Right to Philosophy I, trans. Jan Plug,  
Stanford: Stanford U.P., 2002, 1-66 and ‘Mochlos; or, The Conflict of the Faculties,’ trans. Richard 
Rand and Amy Wygant,  in Logomachia: The Conflict of the Faculties, ed. Richard Rand, Lincoln and 
London: University of Nebraska Press, 1992, 1-34. 
 6 
Derrida is playing here on the physical site of Cornell University, including its 
prospect of the Fall Creek suspension bridge and the gorge which it spans, but the 
question of the rendering of reason, its groundlessness, leads him to an issue which is 
crucial in any consideration of the current role of the concept of information within 
the university and university teaching. The issue concerns not so much what he 
elsewhere calls the fold – ‘La figure du pli’ (Du droit 62) – between constative and 
perfomative language, but rather the lack of any guarantee in the destination of reason  
once it has been (or has apparently been) conveyed.
7
 There is a lack of guarantee in  
the destination (the interpretation, the understanding, but particularly the use) of the 
reason that is conveyed in the university which forms the great part of what Derrida 
has to say in ‘The Principle of Reason.’ Presenting this issue in terms of the 
unworkable opposition between oriented and fundamental research, Derrida is at 
pains to remind us that there is no guarantee in any form of research (however ‘pure,’  
however useless it might appear), that a technological, transnational economy, 
increasingly centered on the military, can always potentially (and in reality) find a use 
for and thus appropriate such research. 
 The issue of guarantee, a guarantee for reason, and in particular a guarantee 
for the rendering of reason we call university teaching and research, is a subject of 
constant university speech today. The ‘phrases’ cited by Maskell and Robinson above 
can be said to emanate from the bureaucratic university’s obsession with what Derrida 
calls ‘calculation.’ Information, Derrida argues, is the medium, the ‘operator,’ by 
which oriented and fundamental research are ‘integrated’: 
                                                          
7
 . One of the results of Derrida’s work, of course, is to open to question the verbs by which the content 
of research and teaching are put in motion. A great deal of work could be done on these verbs, which 
include the following: convey, transmit, relay, transfer, transport, conduct, profess, confess, 
communicate, instruct, demonstrate, display, exhibit and, of course, inform. All of these verbs have a 
problematic, unstable relation to the notion of rendering. They all, when read, question the ‘calculation’ 
 7 
Information ensures the insurance of calculation and the calculation of 
insurance . . . . ‘Information’ . . . is the most economic, the most rapid  and the 
clearest (univocal, eindeutig) stockpiling, recording and communication of 
news. It must instruct men about the safeguarding [Sicherstellung] of what 
will meet their needs, ta khreia. Computer technology, data banks, artificial 
intelligences, translating machines, and so forth, all these are constructed on 
the basis of that instrumental determination of a calculable language. 
 
Derrida’s description, informed as it is by Heideggar’s Der Satz von Grund, makes it 
quite clear why the bodysnatching school of thought might come to raise information 
to the central sign of the system of politico-economic and technological reason which 
has apparently usurped the principle of reason within the university. Such a school of 
thought will inevitably wish to counter the claims for information (transparency, 
objectivity, unending opportunities for improvement in the conveyance, transmission 
and relay of thought, and so on) with the vision of a mindless, dehumanized, 
technological arena of mere operational competence. Derrida, in his description, 
however, reminds us that information is not in fact simply passive technological 
(rather than human) conveyance, transmission, relay, but actively forms the content of 
the thought which it helps to convey: 
Information does not inform merely by delivering an information content, it 
gives form, ‘in-formiert,’ ‘formiert zugleich.’ It installs man in a form that 
permits him to ensure his mastery on earth and beyond. All this has to be 
pondered as the effect of the principle of reason, or, put more rigorously, has 
to be analyzed as the effect of a dominant interpretation of that principle, of a 
certain emphasis in the way we heed its summons. (13) 
 
Information, the information-based university, might seem to be able to render itself, 
to ground itself, in the idea of an information (techno-scientific) -based education for 
an information (techno-scientific) society, and yet it partakes of the same act of 
concealment, the same hidden abyss or empty gorge, as the principle of reason it 
appears to replace. We cannot in fact separate reason and information, a fact which 
reminds us (something we, university men and women, need reminding of at present) 
                                                                                                                                                                      
discussed below. None of them, that is to say, aid the ‘calculable language’ of the techno-scientific 
 8 
that information, like reason itself, cannot calculate itself (its effects, its destination, 
its uses, its value). It is not possible for information to account for itself as the new, 
post-modern principle of reason, and as such, despite the grand claims for 
transparency and accountability within the new, bureacratic (techno-scientific) 
universities, the destination of information (like that of reason) is not in any sense 
guaranteed. There is a formlessness within information, an abyss or hole which derails 
its promise (its calculation, its insurance) of the arrival of form. In particular, I would 
suggest, information, as it currently operates within the techno-scientific university, 
conceals the question of what I have been calling the conveyance, transmission or 
relay of form. Unable to untie itself from the principle of reason, information retains 
the radical, unanswerable question of what we might call in-forming. This question, of 
in-forming, is precisely a question of calculation, insurance and guarantee, and it 
remains available for thought, for a questioning which would precisely respect that 
call for responsibility Derrida, at the end of ‘The Principle of Reason,’ articulates in 
terms of a ‘double gesture’ to ‘keep the memory and keep the chance.’ (20) 
 Information is, of course, a concept inextricably linked to the question of right, 
the rights of the state and the rights of the citizens or subjects of the state. Tony 
Blair’s government treads a thin line when it begins to water down now long-
established promises for greater Freedom of Information, as a recent Leader column 
in The Observer demonstrates: 
New Labour came to office nearly six years ago promising to end the British 
establishment’s fetish for secrecy. When this government’s much diluted 
Freedom of Information Act finally comes into force in 2005, its many opt-
outs and loopholes will still enable Ministers to suppress material which is 
merely inconvenient or embarrassing. Ludicrously, much correspondence with 
foreign governments which is made freely available in Stockholm, Brussels or 
Washington will still be withheld in Britain.
8
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
university without opening within that language an abysmal secret of incalculability. 
 9 
The power of the phrase ‘Freedom of Information,’ with its attack on the very idea of 
secrecy, can make it very difficult to question the concept of information as it 
functions in universities and other teaching institutions. Questioning the concept of 
information will inevitably appear an act tantamount to a public declaration of 
concealment. To question the concept of information can and perhaps must appear a 
wholly irresponsible act, an act of withholding, a refusal to impart or convey (give up) 
what is already the ethical and legal property of others.
9
 
 This view of information (as a right), however, is based on a sanitized 
definition of the term, focussed mainly on the third and fourth senses of the verb (to 
inform) given in the Oxford English Dictionary: ‘III. 1. To form (the mind, character, 
etc.), esp. by imparting learning or instruction; hence, To instruct, teach; to advise. 2. 
To impart knowledge of some particular fact or occurrence to; to tell (one) of 
something; to apprise. 3. a. To give information; to report. b. To lay or exhibit an 
information, bring a charge or complaint. IV. 1. To impart knowledge of; to instruct 
in, to teach. 2. To make known, report, relate.’ These meanings, hygienic in their 
suggestion of a transparent (objective, calculable, fact- or data-based) conveyance 
form the basis for the first three senses of the noun: ‘1. communication of instructive 
knowledge. An instruction. 2. The action of telling or fact of being told something. 3. 
That of which one is apprised or told; intelligence, news.’ These are the clean senses, 
before the law and legal recriminations and the naming of names takes the concept 
over into a gothic world of secrets and lies already signalled in 3.b of the verb (‘The 
action of informing against, charging or accusing (a person) . . . . A complaint of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8.  ‘Tell us no secrets, tell us no lies,’ The Observer, Sunday January 5, 2003. 
9
 . The issue of the ‘Freedom of Information’ is perhaps even more intense in Ireland, since the 
‘Freedom of Information Act’ was established in the same year, 1997, as the ‘Universities Act.’ 
Despite the fact that the latter has much to say about another kind of freedom, namely ‘Academic 
Freedom,’ the contingent relationship between the two acts creates an impression, within and outside 
 10 
Crown in respect of some civil claim’) and before a final theological sense pitches us 
backwards into a world of animation and anthropomorphic power beyond all apparent 
calculation or reason (‘The action of informing with some active or essential quality; 
inspiration, animation.’). These last theological senses take us back to the aspects of 
the verb that a contemporary discourse of rights, and in our case educational rights, 
would hide, conceal, make secret for the sake of a world without secrets: ‘Inform, v. 
from Latin, informare, shape, form an idea of, describe. I. 1. To put into form or 
shape; to shape; to arrange, compose. 2. To take shape; to form. II. To give “form”’ or 
formative principle to; hence, to stamp, impress, or imbue with  some specific quality 
or attribute; to inspire, animate.’ Or rather, these senses of information, which bring to 
sight the act of in-forming, are clean, hygienic, only if they are read in the transparent, 
techno-scientific rather than theological, senses (III and IV) of the verb catalogued 
above. A negation (in Freud’s sense) of information makes in-forming as calculable 
as a neutral reporting of fact, data, atomized content, bytes. The violence of shaping 
(to stamp, impress, imbue) is concealed, along with the onto-theological categories of 
creation: inspiration (‘a breathing or infusion into the mind or soul’) and animation. 
The university of information
10
, like the university of mere reason (bloße Vernunft) 
before it, is uncomfortable with the idea that its in-forming might in fact be an 
awakening of an inanimate body.
11
 Both universities (of reason, of information) strive 
to conceal the possibility that their raison d’ếtre, their destination (see ‘Principle,’ 3), 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the universities involved, that transperancy (the right to information, in whatever form, for all) is the 
new, legislative and ethical, principle upon which the newly defined universities stand or fall. 
10
 . I would suggest that we revise Bill Readings’ ‘university of excellence’ with the even more 
Lyotardian nomination, the university of information. 
11. We might think here of Kant’s famous footnote to Ch. 2. 9. of The Conflict of the Faculties in which 
an idea of a complete revolution in the politico-social order, ‘Cromwell’s abortive monster of a 
despotic republic excepted,’ remains decisively a fiction: ‘The same goes for political creations as for 
the creation of the world; no human being was present there, nor could he have been present at such an 
event, since he must have been his own creator otherwise.’ Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the 
Faculties in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant,  Religion and Rational Theology, 
trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1996, p.307. 
 11 
might be creation (animation, inspiration, in-forming). One should perhaps refine this 
statement further and speak of an ungrounded, non-originary, foundationless creation 
or in-forming. One should certainly, I would suggest, consider the possibility of an 
informé teaching, a teaching which takes seriously the lesson of informé: ‘Inform. a. 
from Latin, informis. 1. Having no regular form; unshapen, mis-shapen. 2. Without 
form; formless; of the nature of matter unendowed with “form”.’ An informé teaching 
would, amongst other things, take seriously, as a responsibility, the fact that its 
teaching, its in-forming, can lead, can always lead, to a lack of shape, or even a mis-
shape. An informé teaching would present itself as a teaching which was, not 
defiantly but logically, beyond calculation, which means beyond any guarantee of 
form. 
 Victor Frankenstein, icon today of the academic man let loose from the 
constraining limits of transparent, hygienic reason, unheeding of the legal and ethical 
call of a transparent information, comes to learn (or does he?) that secular (scientific, 
reasoned) animation breeds a monster. The creature itself, with its entreaty ‘listen to 
me,’ comes to learn that information (receiving and giving information) leads only to 
further confirmation of its (the creature’s) own illegitimacy. And the reader? The 
reader learns that there is no friend, a friend, throughout the novel, being figured, 
intertextually, as an Enlightenment, one might say Rousseauistic teacher (preceptor) 
who can animate a human mind or soul from first principles.
12
 Victor (silently 
alluding to a Shakespearean monster’s self-description) says to Walton, in a passage 
added to the 1831 edition of the novel: ‘we are unfashioned creatures, but half made 
                                                          
12. In this sense, the phrase which structures Derrida’s book on friendship suits the novel perfectly: ‘O 
my friends, there is no friend.’ See Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship trans. George Collins, 
London and New York: Verso, 1997. For a full examination of Frankenstein as a text about the limits 
of Enlightenment education I refer readers to texts forthcoming by the present author. 
 12 
up, if one wiser, better, dearer than ourselves - such a friend ought to be - do not lend 
his aid to perfectionate our weak and faulty natures.’13  
 Which leaves the question, what do my students (roughly 150 each year in the 
course in question) learn when I have informed them of all this, with the additional 
reflection that ‘I am, also, a monster’ (a being, like themselves, ‘unfashioned . . . but 
half made up,’ in search of a friend who will never arrive)? The friend, in this 
Rousseauistic, but also Godwinian, sense, is a teacher who can guarantee the results 
(the form or shape) of their teaching. The friend, in other words, is the teacher who 
can render reason or, today, information, and in any case can in-form without risk, 
without secrets, without chance. ‘O my friends, there is no friend.’ What will my 
students have learnt when I have taken the chance (a chance offered uniquely by this 
text, Frankenstein) of this teaching, this informé or monstrous teaching? For the 
answer one would have to wait (maybe one would have to wait for years or 
interminably) and then one would have to speak to every single one of them. 
                                                          
13
 . The Novels and Selected Works of Mary Shelley, Vol. 1., Frankenstein, or The Modern Prometheus, 
ed. Nora Crook, London: Pickering and Chatto, 1996, p.187. the allusion is to Richard III, see editor’s 
comment p.187. 
 13 
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